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Initial thoughts on Restorative Justice 
  
                       The world since Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469—1527) The Prince (original, Il 
Principe, 1513) has swerved1 to a new construct which would be unrecognisable to the 
inaugurators of the European Renaissance, or Continental Early Modernism. Restorative 
justice has its ontology in Early Modern thinkers, especially, Marsilio Ficino (1433-99), 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola2 (1463-1494), and the Enlightenment thinker, Giambattista 
                                                          
1 See Greenblatt S, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (Norton 2011). Greenblatt in his “The 
Cultivation of Anxiety: King Lear and His Heirs,” Learning to curse: essays in early modern culture (Routledge 
2015), as also in his The Swerve clearly shows how there was a rupture in both political and specifically judicial 
discourses. The wergild or the man-price of the Scandinavian nations gave way to a more humane system of 
justice. Greenblatt is not a philosopher but a scholar of Early Modern literature. This author feels that 
literature has much to contribute to jurisprudence. Therefore, it is apt to illustrate the concept of the ‘swerve’ 
from Greenblatt. It is further interesting to note that the wergild is cognate with the Code of Hammurabi (circa 
1750 B.C.) Wergild is also to be found in Rothair’s Edict of 643 A.D.  Therefore, it is only with the rise first of 
European Humanism and then of English humanism do we have the ‘swerve’ from the Mosaic Code to Christ’s 
Laws of Love. Restorative justice as a concept in Europe and America has preoccupied both Judaic law makers 
in general and specifically, Hasidic Jews in the United States. Similarly, Christian exegetes have seen Jesus’s 
commandments as the source of Restorative Justice in both Europe and the United States of America. On the 
concept of wergild, see Crosby MB, The Making of a German Constitution: a Slow Revolution (Berg 2011), pp. 
108 & 120 for wergild’s importance understanding both justice and restorative justice even in 2017. The best 
and fullest lucid discussion on the concept of wergild is to be found in Simmel G and others, “The Money 
Equivalent of Personal Values: Wergild,” The philosophy of money (Third enlarged edition, Routledge 2004). On 
the concept of restorative justice and wergild in Judaism see Gorsky J, Exiles in Sepharad : The Jewish 
Millennium in Spain (The Jewish Publication Society 2015). For a Christian understanding of restorative justice 
vis-à-vis the Mosaic Code see Chandler D, “The New Commandment,” The royal law of liberty: living in freedom 
under Christ's law of love (Trafford 2003). The issues raised in this footnote are beyond the scope of this paper 
but nonetheless without mentioning these, it is impossible to re-interrogate the discourse of restorative justice 
now, that is, in mid-2017.   
2 Without his De hominis dignitate (Oration on the Dignity of Man, 1486); there would not have been possible 
any movement away from the Mosaic Law of an eye for an eye; the rediscovery of Jesus’ primacy of Platonic 
‘agape’. Without ‘agape’ and Jesus’ negation of Mosaic Laws, we would not have the removal of wergild, 
leading to restorative justice.  
Vico3 (1668-1744).  Ficino’s role is in reviving Plato’s political philosophy4 is important to any 
discussion on restorative justice. It was these early Modern thinkers who removed the concept 
of wergild from Europe.  Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man establishes the essential 
nature of man, the Christian ecce homo, leading to the Hasidic scholar Martin Buber’s (1878-
1968) restoration of dignity to the human person. Buber’s emphasis on the essentiality of the 
presence (‘Gegenwart’) in his I and Thou (1923); that is to say, the essential dignity of the 
human person made in the image of Yahweh, is what will make explicit the need for rethinking 
problems posed by current prison systems in the British Isles and the United States of America. 
It is only when we see others as Buber’s Thou, do we begin to understand the need to invest 
both metaphorically as well as literally in the study of the penal system in the light of restorative 
justice. A justice system which does not heal, does not restore, as it were, the humanity of the 
perpetrator, which does not set right the Covenant between the perpetrator and what Immanuel 
Kant terms the noumenon, is not justice. Machiavelli who seemed so pertinent at the beginning 
of this section can be set aside with the notorious Codes of Hammurabi (1754 BC) as being 
just too inhuman. Hammurabi had little to do with wergild since even the Sutton Hoo findings 
do not justify any cross-continental juridical exchange of ideas. Wergild is a very ancient and 
original European idea which exerted its power in the ancient world independently of 
Hammurabi’s Codes. Machiavelli was mentioned at the beginning to show why we must reject 
The Prince as robbing the human person of what later Immanuel Kant will term ethical 
                                                          
3 Vico in his 1708 work, De Nostri Temporis Studiorum Ratione (On the Order of the Scholarly Disciplines of Our 
Times) makes a case for considering many sides of one argument. That is, in plain terms, Vico makes a case for 
sympathy directed towards the human person. Human agency is prioritised, but not at the cost of humanism 
qua humanity. Vico makes the case for the Vitruvian man to be a person made abject and therefore worthy of 
respect and thus affects jurisprudence, since the being human demands justice which does not punish but 
restore one’s dignity and in a more Judaeo-Christian sense, demands empathy. Thus, both Pico della Mirandola 
and Vico pave the way for restorative justice.   
4 Plato’s treatment of the jury in his Phaedo and earlier, in his Republic cannot be omitted in any discussion on 
restorative justice but their full implications are beyond this essay’s purview. Suffice it to say that Plato was 
reread by Ficino who along with other Neo-Platonists, made a strong case for treating the human person with 
empathy and thus in this sense, contributed to a more humane system of justice and thus both Plato and the 
Neoplatonists are important in our discussions about restorative justice.  
‘categorical imperatives’. Without logocentric ethics, there cannot be crimes; without 
logocentric absolute and radical Kantian evil, there cannot be crimes and without crimes do not 
arise and need for justice or restoration of dignity to the perpetrator. Absolute evil is to be won 
over by absolute humanity derived from the aforementioned Early Modern thinkers and radical 
evil needs to be countered with the Kantian categorical imperative of absolute good. This is the 
good that Iris Murdoch wrote of in her book The Sovereignty of Good (1970). It is keeping in 
mind this swerve that we now seek methods to reform the penal system in the British Isles. 
Increased technological advances, more stringent laws by the United Nations have done little 
to change the criminal-correction system in the United Kingdom. In fact technology facilitates 
Michel Foucault’s (1926-84) panopticon’s becoming truly the all-roving eye of the Big 
Brother; and Foucault’s book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975) seems 
more prophetic and in a certain sense, more Orwellian than ever. The much-touted differences 
between the crime and the criminal; the sin and the sinner are all the more pronounced by their 
ubiquitous absence.  
 
                           Punishment using prisons was not very popular until the late 18th century. One 
of the reasons why we find a lack of mention of prisons till then is more insidious: criminals 
and the clinically insane were kept all together in abysmal-subliminal places. This was because 
a criminal was supposed to lose her or his humanity by the acting our or praxes of criminal 
intent. This loss of humanity was conflated with the loss of sanity. Therefore, the criminal 
justice system while meting out disproportionate punishment to perpetrators of crime; made 
the mentally ill, criminal. This is a perfect travesty of justice. Even today, there is a tendency 
to conflate clinical mental ill health with (Kantian) radical evil-doers. The deviant presupposes 
a norm; this scale of deviancy is produced through a nexus between pharmacologists, 
psychiatrists and the mental healthcare system as is seen in the various versions of the The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American 
Psychiatric Association. Therefore, deviancy itself is a fluid term and what is criminal is itself 
continually in a flux. Thus we need to separate absolute acts of crimes like murder (excluding 
that in self-defense), child-abuse and rapes from what is loosely termed both in jurisprudence 
and in psychiatry as deviancy. Rather, for the purpose of this paper we will interrogate radical 
evils and our reaction as an Aristotelian polity to such crimes. The past century has seen 
unprecedented violence and prisons have been mostly used as tools for removing subversive 
socially defiant forces, as distinct from criminal or deviant individuals who meet often arbitrary 
criteria set in the version of the DSM then in force, from repressive regimes. Prisons, as 
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) pointed out during his incarcerations are stable state machinery 
effecting the realpolitik of oppressions and effects the silence of dissent. Prison systems the 
world over are marked by the hegemonic powers of institutions of governance including those 
of the hierarchic judiciary5. The original swerve understood the prison system to be corrective. 
It is in fact atavistic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 See Gramsci A, Prison Notebooks (Joseph A Buttigieg and Antonio Callari trs Columbia University Press 2011) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(Pastiche) Thoughts on Jurisprudence: 
                     There are many approaches to the meaning of jurisprudence and the etymologic 
meaning is readily available online in various avatars but we need to only stress its origins in 
being prudent (from prudentia)6. Circumspection and prudence are virtues which solidified as 
opaque ethical structures even before Patristics codified prudence as a major virtue. Rather, we 
will focus on the works of thinkers like Gary Minda7 and Kyron Huigens8.  Minda’s 
understanding of jurisprudence is a continuation of the Early Modern ‘swerve’ discussed in the 
Introduction. Minda writes:  
Another group of postmodern critics, the ironists, attempt to facilitate the crisis 
and fragmentation of modern theory by employing postmodern criticism to 
'displace, decenter, and weaken' central concepts of modern legal Western 
thought. They are ironists because they claim that the discourse of modern 
Western thought has been effective--very effective--but not for the reason 
                                                          
6 See among other sources readily available through search engines, the one at “Jurisprudence” (The Free 
Dictionary June 11, 2017) <http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/jurisprudence> accessed June 11, 
2017. All freely available online sources are similar to each other in their definition of jurisprudence. This 
etymologic meaning is relevant to the discussion only in so far as it constitutes a general review of the term as 
part of ‘literature’ review and only in pointing out the need for prudence in deciding quanta of punishment for 
quanta of crime committed.  
7 Minda G, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence at Century's End (Oxford University Press 
1995) 
8 Huigens’s The Jurisprudence of Punishment which appeared in the William and Mary Law Review, April 2007 
is very important to our discussion here. The entire article is relevant to this essay and no one single 
quotations can possibly do justice to the article. Therefore, this article bye Huigens is footnoted, as necessary 
reading on restorative justice.  
 
modernists imagine. Ironists assert that the significance of modernism lies not 
in specific prescriptions or social tasks, but rather that it lies in the intellectual 
pursuit of theory as an end to itself. (Minda 230) 
It is this distrust of a metanarrative of power that marks this inquiry into restorative justice 
since we must question the nature of justice itself in the Prophetic mode. The Major and Minor 
Biblical Prophets kept questioning the Law and finally Mosaic Law was questioned by 
Christian exegetes and keeping in mind that both British and American lawmakers being 
mostly devout Christians we should see law in praxes within this Prophetic mode and through 
the swerve to the works of the likes of Minda and Huigens. Therefore, there arises the need to 
analyse the etymologic origins of jurisprudence. But with the caveat that prudence is a 
questionable trope since Richard Rorty (1931-2007)9. Restorative justice aka jurisprudence has 
to be structured around key findings within post-modernist tendencies in the legal system 
arising out of the works of the likes of Rorty.                          
 
                           …Legal realism argues that the real world practice of law is what determines 
what law is; the law has the force that it does because of what legislators, lawyers and judges 
do with it.10 The central target of legal realism was legal formalism: the classical view that 
judges do not make law, but mechanically apply it by logically deducing uniquely correct legal 
conclusions from a set of clear, consistent, and comprehensive legal rules.11 Though many 
aspects of legal realism are today seen as exaggerated or outdated it established that law is not, 
and cannot be, an exact science.12 Legal realism like legal positivism pose real dangers now. 
In this era of machine intelligence or AI, big data mining can become an inflexible process 
which delivers justice in a dystopic manner where Philip K. Dick’s short story Minority Report 
(1957) is now more prescient than George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949).  Restorative 
                                                          
9 Rorty R, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Harvard University Press 
2003) 
10Robert A. Shiner, "Legal Realism," in Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press) 1995 
11Brian Leiter, "American Legal Realism," in Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson, The Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (eds.) Oxford, (Blackwell, 2005) 50 
12Lief H. Carter and Thomas F. Burke, Reason in Law, (8th ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2015) 
justice flounders at the dual doors of legal positivism and legal realism. Both the positivist and 
the realist views are mechanical and so to speak, materially deterministic reducing the scope 
for delivering justice which heals. Artificial Intelligence poses a threat to the delivery of justice 
in a manner which is mediated by algorithms of law and legal procedures. The danger as this 
researcher feels, is an overt reliance on procedures of law and structurally inscrutable 
government automatized forces making emotional appeals, on which restorative justice 
ultimately depends, redundant and will make a mockery of the humanity which justice of all 
forms including the Mosaic Law strives to enforce. As had been discussed earlier; Martin 
Buber’s fear of treating normative criminals as Thou will be reduced to just A.I. interacting 
with It.  
The post-modernity in law of Minda and Huigens mentioned above have now given over to the 
post-human. The post-human elicits the writing of this paper for data mining by social media 
pose real threats to all domains of life; and poses an imminent danger to any chance for 
restorative justice. No justice can be anymore tailored to individual cases if human decision 
making is removed and replaced with machines whose outcomes are predetermined.  
 
 
As has been seen, the nature of this study is primarily through critiques of normative 
jurisprudence, which essentially recognizes what law ought to be in an ideal world and overlaps 
this idea with both moral and political philosophy.13 Deontology14, or ‘the theory of duty or 
moral obligation’ and utilitarianism15, the view that ‘laws should be crafted so as to produce 
                                                          
13Robin West, Normative Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
14Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, (2d Coll. Ed. 1978) 378 
 
15Habibi, Don "Mill's Moral Philosophy" John Stuart Mill and the Ethic of Human Growth. Dordrecht: Springer 
Netherlands, (2001) 89 
 
the best consequences for the greatest number of people possible’ are essential elements of this 
paper. Virtue jurisprudence is drawn upon and used to the extent that an ideal or utopian society 
cannot be created without virtuous people.16 Deontology and virtue jurisprudence both are 
equally harmful now in the post-human era where post-modernism and Cosmopolitanism are 
both giving ways to unthought of machine interference. Virtue as eudaimonia cannot be 
understood by any form of machine learning. The imminent death knell to concepts of 
restorative justice has been rung and unless we challenge set-tropes in tomes of legal 
lexicography, the chances are that wergild will return and we will be swerved into a pre-Early 
Modern legal system. Machines do not comprehend that human jurisprudence is never written 
in stone.  
The quest to overcome the posthuman brings us to a relatively new and lesser known school of 
jurisprudence called therapeutic jurisprudence which is the study of how legal systems affect 
the emotions, behaviors and mental health of people.17 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence has emerged as the theoretical foundation for an increasing number 
of "problem-solving courts" (see chapter 5) that have transformed the role of the judiciary. 
These paradigm shifts include drug treatment courts, domestic violence courts, mental health 
courts, re-entry courts, teen courts, and community courts.18 For example, the British National 
Health Services is employed routinely by magistrates to treat pedophiles with chemical 
castration protocols.   
Initially therapeutic jurisprudence was employed in cases involving individuals with mental 
disabilities but subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area; therapeutic jurisprudence 
presents a new model for assessing the impact of case- law and legislation, recognizing that, as 
a therapeutic agent, there are specific laws that can have therapeutic or anti‐therapeutic 
                                                          
16Kyron Huigens, Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory 
17Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. West Group, 2009) 
18Winick and Wexler, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts, 2003 
consequences.19The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal 
rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic 
potential without subordinating due process qua procedural principles.20 
Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives”21and 
focuses on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being of the 
transgressor. It suggests that “law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid 
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other 
values served by law should attempt to bring about healing and wellness”.22,23 
In this regard, the significance of the US Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. must 
be noted24: 
‘We have known – for decades – that community treatment “works” better, that there is less 
improper use of antipsychotic medication in community settings, that community patients are 
                                                          
19Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging 
Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases? 42 Akron L. Rev. (2009) 885  
 
20Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV.,   (2008), p.p. 575, 585-86. 
 
21Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims 
of Crime, (33 NOVA L. REV.  2009) 535 
 
22David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and 
Strategies,  
 
 
23 Daniel P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping 
Profession (Stolle 45, 2006) 
24527 U.S. 581 (1999) 
 
less stigmatized, and stand a better chance of authentic reintegration into all aspects of social, 
economic and personal life’.25 
In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, 
therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as “… a sea-change in ethical thinking about the 
role of law … a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law 
… which emphasizes psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism”.26 Restorative 
justice now at least has the armour of therapeutic jurisprudence in transcending post-humanism. 
The post-human like pre-Renaissance forms of jurisprudence can only be negated by a 
human(e) judiciary where legal corrective measures instead of being coercive are in fact 
therapeutic. There is now a pressing need to overcome the post-human as once there was a 
pressing need to overcome both the wergild and the Law of the Torah.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the 
Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, HOUS. L. REV. 
37 (2000) 
 
 
26Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, (8 J.L. & MED 2001) (30) 328 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
